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This article is concerned with the welfare properties of trade when the behavior of agents
cannot be rationalized by preferences. I investigate this question in an environment of
matching allocation problems. There are two reasons for doing so: rstly, the niteness of
such problems entails that the domain of the agents' choice behavior does not need to be
restricted in any which way to obtain results on the welfare properties of trade. Secondly,
some matching allocation mechanisms have been designed for non-market environments in
which we would typically expect boundedly rational behavior. I nd qualied support for the
statements that all outcomes of trade are Pareto-optimal and all Pareto optima are reachable
through trade. Contrary to the standard case, dierent trading mechanisms lead to dierent
outcome sets when the agents' behavior is not rationalizable. These results remain valid
when restricting attention to \minimally irrational" behavior.
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11 Introduction
Trade leads to Pareto-optimal outcomes and any Pareto-optimal outcome can be reached via
trade. The First and Second Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics state sets of con-
ditions under which these two statements hold true. In this article, I investigate the question
whether and how the assumption of individual rationality is needed to obtain these results.
In other words: I ask whether the two introductory statements on the Pareto optimality of
trade can hold true without the assumption that the agents' behavior is rationalizable, in the
sense that their choice functions can be derived from the maximization of some (transitive and
complete) preference relation.1
I treat this question within a framework of matching allocation problems, in which some
indivisible objects need to be assigned to some agents. In such environments, trade can be iden-
tied with trading-cycles-mechanisms (more on that in Section 4). Two main reasons underlie
my choice of this environment: rst of all, such matching allocation problems are nite. This
entails that no assumptions on preferences are needed to show that trade leads to Pareto-optimal
outcomes and that any Pareto-optimal outcome can be reached via trade in the standard case
in which all agents' behavior is rationalizable (see Abdlukadiroglu and Sonmez [1] and Bade
[6]). The same holds true for the welfare theorems proposed in the present paper; they hold for
all possible choice functions. This is important since assumptions such as local non-satiation or
convex upper contour sets are   if anything   harder to interpret and justify in an environment
of boundedly rational behavior.2
Secondly, some of the non-market environments for which economists have designed matching
mechanisms can serve as prime examples of cases in which to expect non-rationalizable behav-
ior. Take kidney allocation problems as an example. One diculty with the implementation
of mechanisms that match donors to recipients is that doctors are reluctant to state complete
and transitive preferences over kidneys. However, the same doctors do not seem to have any
problem choosing the \best" kidney for a particular patient from a given set.3 This apparent
1The terms \rationalize" or \rationalizable" carry two dierent meanings in economic theory: in game theory,
a strategy prole is considered \rationalizable" if it survives the sequential elimination of dominated strategies. In
decision theory, a choice correspondence is considered \rationalizable" if there exists some transitive and complete
preference relation %, such that the choice correspondence maps any consumption set S to the set of %-maximal
elements in that set S. In this article, I only use the terms in the second sense.
2Some of the eminent studies of the equilibria of competitive markets with boundedly rational agents impose
such conditions on the behavior of agents to obtain results; see Fon and Otani [13], Gale and Mas Colell [14], and
Mandler [18].
3These statements reect a private conversation with Utku Unver, who was involved in the design and practical
implementation of several kidney exchange mechanisms.
2contradiction could arise from doctors having only limited resources to test for quality of kid-
neys.4 If doctors are aware that their decision procedures can lead to non-rationalizable choices,
it is only reasonable for them to refuse to state complete rankings over kidneys.
Alternatively, consider the allocation of elementary school slots to students. Consider the
case in which decisions over schooling are not taken by a single agent, but arise out of the
interaction of some competing interests. One could think of a situation in which a mother
whittles down the available options to be presented to the father, who then chooses among
them. Choices that arise from such strategic interplay are generally not rationalizable.5 So,
given that the assumption of preference maximization appears strong in some environments in
which trading mechanisms have been implemented, we should ask whether the results on the
Pareto optimality of these mechanisms extend to environments with boundedly rational agents.
Some major hurdles need to be cleared before I can go on to state and prove the main results
of the present article: the rst one concerns the fact that the notion of Pareto optimality builds
on the notion of individual preferences. This is problematic, since the very purpose of the present
paper is to cover behavior that cannot be explained by preference maximization. In Section 2
I dene Pareto optimality in terms of two alternative notions of \individual preference". I say
that an agent solidly prefers some object x to another object y if he never chooses y when x is
also available. Conversely, an agent lightly prefers x to y if he chooses x out of at least one set
that also contains y. Each of these two notions of preference yields a dierent notion of Pareto
optimality. For any matching allocation problem, the resulting two sets of Pareto optima are
nested.
The next hurdle is cleared in Section 4, which is concerned with a notion of \free trade"
that applies to an environment without money. In tune with the literature on housing problems,
I identify \trade" with mechanisms that assign property rights over all objects at the outset
and then let agents freely exchange houses in \trading cycles". One last hurdle remains: some
4The following story might explain the contrast between the hesitance to state preferences and the readiness to
choose. Consider the task to nd the \best" kidney for patient x out of a set of ten kidneys. Financial constraints
might force doctors to use some preliminary quick and cheap tests, to limit the set of kidneys on which they run
some more detailed and expensive tests. Call the kidney chosen according to this procedure kidney a. Does this
mean that a should be ranked above any of the other kidneys in the set? Maybe not. Consider the case in which
only a and some other kidney b are available, and assume that b was eliminated following the preliminary tests
in the case of the choice problem, with ten kidneys. Given that there are only two kidneys in the new choice
problem the doctors might now be able to run the detailed and expensive tests on both of them and discover that
kidney b is actually better than a for patient x. Choice functions that can be derived from such procedures have
been characterized by Manzini and Mariotti [20] and by Mandler [19].
5Choice functions that can be derived from such interactive procedures have been characterized by Xu and
Zhou [26] and by Apesteguia and Ballester [3].
3assumptions need to be made on the strategic behavior of agents in such mechanisms. Observe
that the assumption of fully strategic rationality seems overly demanding in an environment in
which individuals are not even individually rational. To resolve this tension, I dene a notion of
truthful implementation in Section 5. This notion can be viewed as a form of boundedly rational
strategic behavior that approximates full strategic rationality.
Once all these hurdles are cleared, I adapt the First and Second Fundamental Theorem of
Welfare Economics to the environment of house allocation problems with boundedly rational
agents in Section 6. In accordance with the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics
I nd that any outcome of trade belongs to the larger set of Pareto optima. In accordance
with the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, I nd that any allocation in the
smaller Pareto set is reachable through trade. Exchanging the two Pareto sets in the preceding
two observations, one obtains stronger analogues of the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare. I
show that these stronger analogues do not hold. These observations are all owed to the fact that
the set of Pareto optima, according to the individual solid rankings of goods, can be very large
whereas the smaller set according to the individual light rankings can be very small (it might
even be empty). I show, in addition, that the sets of allocations that are implemented through
trade dier for dierent trading mechanisms. This yields an interesting contrast to the the case
of rationalizable behavior, in which these sets of allocations all coincide with the set of Pareto
optima.
I rst establish these results for any choice functions. Since these results all depend on the
- potentially large - dierence between the two Pareto sets, I go on to study cases in which
this dierence is smaller: I restrict the sets of permissible choice functions. In this context,
I show that even when assuming that the agent's behavior only \minimally" deviates from
rationalizable behavior, the main results of the article remain valid. Before going into detail,
though, the notions of trade and of truthful implementation as well as the results are previewed
with the help of a simple example (Section 3)
2 The Environment
The problems discussed in the article are represented by triplets E = (N;H;(ci)i2N), where
N denotes the set of agents and H the set of objects that is to be matched to the agents;
the vector (ci)i2N denotes the set of all agents' choice functions on H. The agents are simply
numbered N = f1;:::;jNjg, it is assumed that there are equally many agents and objects:
0 6= jNj = jHj < 1. In accordance with the convention adopted in the literature, the objects
are called houses. Generic elements of the set of houses are denoted by x;y;w, and z. For each
4i 2 N, ci : P(H) ! H with ci(S) 2 S is a choice function representing the choice that agent
i would make when given the opportunity to choose from a set S.6 If a choice function ci is
rationalizable, I write %i for the preferences that rationalize it. Note that the preferences %i
yield single-valued choice correspondences, if and only if %i is a linear order, meaning that it is
transitive, asymmetric and complete. Consequently, the present denition of a (house allocation)
problem is standard, except that the agents' behavior is described by choice functions.7
For a particular problem E = (N;H;(ci)i2N), an allocation is dened as a bijection  : N !
H. Allocations are denoted by vectors , with i denoting agent i's assignment. An allocation
rule  maps problems E = (N;H;(ci)i2N) into allocations (E).
To judge whether a particular allocation  is Pareto-optimal or not, some notions of indi-
vidual \preference" are needed. According to a the rst and weaker denition, I say that agent
i lightly prefers house x over house y, formally xP9
i y, if there exists a set of houses S  H,
such that x;y 2 S and x = ci(S). On the other hand, I say that agent i solidly prefers house
x over house y, formally, xP8
i y, if y 6= ci(S) for all S  H with x;y 2 S. Observe that xP8
i y
holds if there exists no set, such that y is chosen when x is available; conversely, there needs to
exist only one set containing x and y, such that x is chosen for xP9
i y to hold. The two notions of
preference yield two notions of Pareto optimality: an allocation  is called P8 Pareto-optimal






i 6= i) for all i in some non-empty subset K of the set of agents N and i = 0
i for all other
agents. I write PO8(E) (PO9(E)) for the sets of P8- (P9-)Pareto-optimal allocations for prob-
lem E. The notion of solid preference presented here (P8) is identical with (or very similar to)
the notions of preference that Bernheim and Rangel [8], Mandler [18], and Green and Hojman
[15] use to compare outcomes in terms of individual and collective welfare.
Let me summarize some of the important properties of the two notions of preference. Note
that xP8y implies xP9y. Moreover, yP8x holds if and only if xP9y is violated. The relation P9
is always complete, the relation P8 need not be. The two relations coincide if and only if the
underlying choice function is rationalizable which holds if and only if P9 is transitive, which,
in turn, holds if and only if P8 is transitive. While both relations might violate transitivity,
they do so in dierent ways. The statements xP8y and yP8z might hold, even if x and z are
6The set of all subsets of a set X is denoted by P(X).
7Note that the assumption of choice functions as a primitive of the model allows for a much larger range
of \irrationalities" as the assumption of agents that maximize some intransitive and/or incomplete preferences.
The latter assumption for example rules out an agent who chooses frozen yoghurt when oered ice-cream, frozen
yoghurt, and broccoli, but does choose ice cream when only frozen yoghurt and ice-cream are available. Such
choices are permissible in the present model. Examples of studies on trade and/or welfare that assume intransitive
and/or incomplete preferences are Gale and Mas Collel [14] as well as Fon and Otani [13].
5unranked by P8. However, is is impossible that zP8x would hold for the given case. So, P8 is
acyclic. In contrast, for some choice functions xP9y, yP9z, and zP9x hold; the completeness of
the relation P9 implies that x and z must be ranked. In sum, these observations imply that the
two dierent Pareto sets are nested for any problem: PO9(E)  PO8(E) holds for all problems
E. Moreover, for \highly irrational" choice functions there can be many cycles in P9, and P8
might leave many alternatives unranked. In this case, PO9(E) might be very small, even empty,
and PO8(E) might be large.
With these denitions of, and observations on P8- and P9-Pareto optimality in hand, the
guiding questions of the article can be formulated as follows: does free trade lead to P8- (P9-
)Pareto-optimal allocations? Is there a way to allocate ownership rights, such that free trade
results in a given P8- (P9-) Pareto-optimal allocation? Before a detailed denition and discussion
of the concept of free trade in the given context, I will discuss these questions with the help of
a simple example.
3 Example
Consider a house allocation problem E = (N;H;(ci)i2N) with three agents (N = f1;2;3g) and
three houses H: = fx;y;zg. Let the agents' choice functions be given by:
c1(fx;y;zg) = x; c1(fx;yg) = x; c1(fy;zg) = y; c1(fx;zg) = z
c2(fx;y;zg) = y; c2(fx;yg) = y; c2(fy;zg) = z; c2(fx;zg) = x
c3(fx;y;zg) = z; c3(fx;yg) = y; c3(fy;zg) = z; c3(fx;zg) = x:
The given house allocation problem has no P9-Pareto optima. To see this, observe that, on
the one hand, (x;y;z) = 2 PO9(E) as (z;y;x) P9-Pareto-dominates (x;y;z), since c1(fx;zg) = z
and c3(fx;zg) = x. On the other hand, any allocation  6= (x;y;z) is P9-Pareto dominated by
(x;y;z) = (c1(fx;y;zg));c2(fx;y;zg);c3(fx;y;zg). The set of P8-Paerto optima is non-empty.





3 y, and yP8
3 x. The set of P8-Pareto
optima contains three elements (x;y;z), (x;z;y) and (z;y;x).8
For now, let me identify the notion of free trade within the present environment with Gale's
top trading cycles mechanism as dened by Shapley and Scarf [23]. In Section 4, this mechanism
will be embedded in a larger class of trading mechanisms. According to the top trading cycles
mechanism, each agent initially owns one house. The mechanism prescribes that each agent
8To determine the set of P
8-PO, all six possible allocations need to be checked. To see, for instance, that
(y;x;z) is not P
8-Pareto-optimal, observe that agent 1 solidly prefers x to y, whereas agent 2 has the inverse
P
8-preference.
6points to \his most preferred" house and each house points to its owner. At least one cycle
of agents and houses forms. All agents in these cycles are assigned the houses that they point
to. The procedure is repeated with the remaining agents and houses until all agents have been
assigned a house. The mechanism can be viewed as free trade from initial endowments, since,
on the one hand, every house is owned by someone at any moment of the mechanism and, since,
on the other hand, all exchanges are voluntary.
As far as the agents' behavior is concerned, I assume, for now, that at each stage each agent
points to his choice out of the set of all remaining houses. If choices are rationalizable, this
type of behavior coincides with truth-telling, which, in turn, is an equilibrium in the top trading
cycles mechanism. This type of behavior could, therefore, be viewed as an approximation of
strategically rational behavior. I discuss the agents' behavior in a mechanism and theories of
implementation at length in Section 5.
Given this assumption on the agents' behavior, the top trading cycles mechanism implements
the (unique) allocation  = (x;y;z). To see this, observe that according to the hypothesis on
the agents' behavior, each agent i points to i = ci(H) in the rst stage of the mechanism -
no matter which initial allocation they are starting out with. Absent any conict of interest,
each agent i is assigned i in the rst stage of the mechanism. In terms of the quest for welfare
theorems for agents with choice functions that are not rationalizable, the following observations
should be noted for this particular house allocation problem:
In tune with possible versions of the First and Second Fundamental Theorem, any outcome of
free trade is P8-Pareto-optimal and any P9-Pareto-optimal allocation can be reached through
free trade (in the case of the present example, the latter holds trivially, given that the set
of P9-Pareto optima is empty). These are the positive results. In terms of negative results,
note that there are some P8-Pareto optima that cannot be reached through free trade for any
initial allocation. So when using the criterion of P8-Pareto optimality, the Second Fundamental
Theorem of Welfare Economics fails. Conversely, for the notion of P9-Pareto optimality, the
First Fundamental Theorem fails: there is an allocation that is reached for all initial allocations
through free trade, even though this allocation is not P9-Pareto-optimal. These four observations
can conveniently be summarized as the subset relation PO9(E) ( TR(E) ( P8   PO(E),
where the notation TR(E) stands in for the set of all allocations reachable through trade in
the given housing problem E. The main result of the article extends this subset relation to a
much larger class of theories of trade and to all possible problems E. In particular, I consider
a class of trading mechanisms that allows for more unequal distributions of initial wealth than
does the top trading cycles mechanism. I also consider implementation theories according to
7which agents might not be so naive as to consider the set of all remaining houses as their actual
choice set. Finally I show that the strictness of the subset relation remains valid when allowing
only for \minimally irrational" problems E.
4 Trading Mechanisms
In this section, I sketch out Papai's [21] denition of hierarchical exchange mechanisms,
which constitutes a large superclass of Gale's top trading cycles mechanism. The two reasons
for doing so correspond to the two motivations given in the introduction: rst of all, one might
criticize Gale's top trading cycles mechanism as too restrictive a notion of \free trade" as each
agent starts out by owning exactly one house. In contrast, Papai's [21] hierarchical exchange
mechanisms allow for the full spectrum of inequality of initial endowments, ranging from the
most equal case, according to which each agent owns exactly one house, to the most unequal
one, in which one single agent starts out owning all houses.
Secondly, to read the paper as an analysis of the behavioral welfare properties of mechanisms
that have been suggested in the literature, it is useful to study a class of mechanisms that
contains many of these mechanisms as special cases. This is the case for Papai's [21] hierarchical
exchange mechanisms. Subsets of that class have been described by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez
[2], Svensson [24], Ergin [12], Ehlers, Klaus, and Papai [11], Ehlers and Klaus [9], Kesten [17],
Ehlers and Klaus [10], and Velez [25].
In a hierarchical exchange mechanism, all houses start out being owned by someone.
In a rst stage of the mechanism, the designer asks all agents to point to their most preferred
houses. Each house points to its owner. At least one cycle of agents and houses forms. Any
agent in such a cycle is assigned the house he points to and leaves the mechanism with this
assignment (no agent or house can take part in two cycles). If an owner of multiple houses
leaves the mechanism, the subset of his houses that have not been assigned is passed on to the
agents who still await their assignments according to some xed inheritance rule.9 Agents are
once again asked to point to their most preferred houses among the remaining ones and the
same procedure is repeated, until each agents has been assigned a house.10'11 A hierarchical
9So ownership rights in this class of mechanisms take two forms. Either an agent owns a house in the current
period, or he faces the option to become an owner of a house.
10An explicit and detailed denition of hierarchical exchange mechanisms can be found in Papai [21] pp. 1408-
1413.
11According to the denition by Papai [21], cycles are eliminated simultaneously. Bade [6] shows that for the
standard case of rationalizable choice functions, the order of elimination does not matter. To see that, for the
8exchange mechanism is denoted by  .
Hierarchical exchange mechanisms can be viewed as mechanisms arising out of the assignment
of ownership and the ensuing free trades among owners. At any moment in the mechanism,
each house is owned by someone, in the sense that the owner can appropriate the house as his
assignment and leave the mechanism. Before the nal assignments are made, the ownership
of multiple houses is feasible. Any exchanges are voluntary. So one might argue that Papai's
[21] hierarchical exchange mechanisms do represent the notion of trade that is appropriate for
matching allocation problems. Since these mechanisms allow for a very broad and ne spectrum
of initial endowments, ranging from maximal to minimal inequality, there are probably no other
mechanisms for matching allocation problems that could be described as mechanisms of \free
trade".12 However, it is important to note that, as long as one identies trade with some subclass
of the set of hierarchical exchange mechanisms, the results of the present article apply.
One might argue, in addition, that hierarchical exchange mechanisms (or some subclass
thereof) are of interest in their own right: most mechanisms that have been suggested in the
literature as optimal - from some point of view or other - are comprised by the set of hierar-
chical exchange mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms have been put into practice in real-life
matching allocation problems. It is, therefore, of interest to know how the sets of outcomes
of such mechanisms relate to the sets of Pareto optima in the matching allocation problems in
which they are used.
Hierarchical exchange mechanisms specify ownership rights and determine the agents who
hold these rights. To answer the main questions of the article, it must be possible to assign
these same rights in dierent ways to the dierent agents. If some mechanism  , for example,
prescribes that agent 3 starts out owning houses h1;h4 and h5, there should be an alternative
mechanism that prescribes that agent 1 starts out owning these houses. To this end, I dene a
permutation p : N ! N as an initial assignment of ownership for a hierarchical exchange
case of non-rationalizable choice functions, this order does matter, reconsider the Example provided in Section 3
together with Gale's top trading cycles mechanism with the initial endowment (x;y;z). In stage one, each agent
points to his own endowment. According to the present denition of hierarchical exchange mechanisms, all three
top trading cycles are eliminated simultaneously and (x;y;z) is the resulting assignment. If, on the other hand,
only agent 2 and house y are eliminated in stage one, in stage two the agents 1 and 3 point to each other's houses.
Given the sequential elimination of top trading cycles, the allocation (z;y;x) would be obtained.
12Pycia and Unver[22] characterize a superset of the set of all hierarchical exchange mechanisms: they show that
the set of all strategy-proof and Pareto-optimal allocation mechanisms is the set of \trading cycles with brokers
and owners". These mechanisms cannot be described as the result of ownership assignments and free trade alone.
In Pycia and Unver [22]'s mechanisms, there are two types of control rights over houses: the rights of owners and
the rights of brokers. A broker's control rights over some house do not involve the right to appropriate the house
himself.
9mechanism  . The mechanism that arises when permuting the roles of all agents by the bijection
p is denoted by p , and is also called a permutation of a hierarchical exchange mechanism.
If under   some agent i is the initial owner of a subset of houses S, then for p , agent p(i) is
the owner of this subset; if under   some agent i0 is supposed to inherit house x after the initial
owner i00 of x is assigned y, then under p , agent p(i0) is to inherit x after p(i00) is assigned y.
Hierarchical exchange mechanisms generalize the top trading cycles mechanism insofar as
some agents might initially own multiple houses while others own none. Inheritance rules are
introduced to solve the problem that agents may not own multiple houses in any outcome
of a mechanism. Serial dictatorships constitute another special case of hierarchical exchange
mechanisms: in this case, the rst agent is the initial owner of all houses; he forms a cycle by
pointing to one of his houses and is assigned that house; all remaining houses are inherited by
the next dictator. Any permutation of serial dictatorship consists in a reordering of the sequence
of dictators. Permutations of Gale's top trading cycles mechanism consist in permutations of
the initial assignment of houses.
The denition of permuted hierarchical exchange mechanisms makes it possible to ask ques-
tions such as: is there an assignment of initial ownership rights, such that allocation  arises for
some given type of trading mechanism? The next section is concerned with the last missing link
to answer such questions: of course, to know whether  is implemented by some mechanism p ,
we need to have a theory on the agents' behavior in a mechanism.
5 Implementation
To relate the allocations that can be reached via trade to the (dierent sets of) Pareto optima in
some housing problem E, we need to know which allocations are implemented by a mechanism.
Standard notions of implementation presume individual rationality and can, therefore, not be
applied directly to the present context. Moreover, the assumptions on the agents' strategic
rationality, embodied in some notions of implementation, clash with the present assumption
that agents are not even individually rational. In this section, I rst dene a notion of truthful
implementation, which assumes that agents provide truthful answers to the designer's questions.
In the ensuing discussion, I compare this notion of implementation with some other notions. I
will argue, in particular, that the bounded strategic rationality associated with truthful imple-
mentation blends nicely with the assumption that agents are boundedly rational in terms of
individual choice.
A mechanism   is said to implement truthfully an allocation  in a housing problem E
if  is the allocation that results when all agents provide truthful answers to the designer. In
10turn, an agent's response is considered truthful if the following two conditions are met. First of
all, house x must be P8
i  maximal in H0 for agent i to claim that he likes house x most among
the set of remaining houses H0. Secondly, there needs to be a set S0 of at least two houses with
S  S0  H0, such that ci(S0) = x, where the set S is the set of houses currently owned by agent
i. Finally, T is called a theory of truthful implementation if it prescribes truthful answers
to the designer's questions.
Let me rst justify why such theories are called \truthful". Consider the rst requirement:
it implies that agent i cannot claim to like house y most out of the set H0 when there exists
some other house z 2 H0, such that agent i would not choose y out of any subset S, if z was also
available in that subset S. If preferences are rationalizable, this condition holds, if and only if
agent i claims to most like the (unique) %i-maximal element in H0. However, given that agents'
behavior is not necessarily rationalizable multiple houses might satisfy this requirement. This is
where the second requirement comes into play. It states that agent i should have some theory
on the set of houses S0 he is actually choosing from, and that this theory should be consistent
with the underlying facts. The houses currently owned by the agent (S) should certainly be in
that imaginary choice-set S0. He should, moreover, not perceive any houses that already left the
market to be part of his choice-set (which accounts for S0  H0). Finally, the requirement that
S0 should contain at least two elements implies that the agent should consider an actual choice
situation when choosing to point to his own house. To see that the set of truthful theories of
implementation is not empty, let S0 = H0 for any set of remaining houses H0. Then S  S0  H0,
ci(S0) = ci(H0), and there is no other house in H0 that is solidly preferred to ci(H0).13
If the agents' behavior is rationalizable, hierarchical exchange mechanisms are strategyproof:
in fact, truth-telling (announcing one's true preferences to the designer) is a dominant strategy
(in the normal form representation of any hierarchical exchange mechanism). So we might ask:
can truthful revelation as described above also be considered \equilibrium behavior" for the case
of agents whose behavior is not rationalizable? A minimal requirement for a strategy prole
to be an equilibrium should be that no agent can solidly improve upon his assignment when
changing his strategy, holding everyone else's strategy xed. It turns out that truth-telling need
13This is the theory of implementation used in the example in Section 3. One could also consider theories that
have more of an equilibrium avor. Such a theory could require that an allocation is implemented by a mechanism
if the mechanism has an \e-strategy prole" that results in this allocation. A strategy prole is considered an
\e-strategy prole" if at any stage the set S
0 that agent i based his choice ci(S
0) upon must not only contain
all houses currently owned by the agent, but also all the houses which are \oered" to i according to the given
strategy prole. Certainly these two theories are not the only ones that t the notion of implementation advocated
above.
11not be an equilibrium as demonstrated by the following example:
Example 1 Let H = fx;y;z;wg. Let the choices of agents 1, 2, and 3 be rationalizable by
x i y i z i w for i = 1;2;3. Let agent 4's choice function be given by the conditions c4(S) 6= x
if z 2 S, c4(S) 6= w if x 2 S, c4(S) 6= y if w 2 S, c4(y;z;w) = w, and c4(y;z) = y. Together




4 y holds. Now let us consider the top trading cycles mechanism with an initial endowment
 = (x;z;w;y). Truth-telling implies that the agents with rationalizable preferences all point to
house x. Agent 4 must point to house z since it is the unique maximizer of P8
4 in H. There is
only one cycle, and that cycle is of minimal length. Agent 1 leaves with his initial endowment
x. In the next stage, agents 2 and 3 point to house y. Agent 4 must point to house w: he
cannot point to y as wP8
4 y, he cannot point to z as c4(S0) 6= z for any set S0 containing z and
at least one other element. In this stage, agents 3 and 4 exchange houses, and agent 2 keeps his
endowment z. For this strategy prole, agent 2 would be better o by pointing to house y in
the rst stage of the mechanism. In that stage, agent 4 is willing to swap houses with him. If
agent 2 chooses not to tell the truth in this stage, his nal assignment is y instead of z, where
y 2 z.
In fact, the strategy prole described is the unique truthful strategy prole in the example.
Consequently, the same example can be used to show that some hierarchical exchange mecha-
nisms simply do not have truth-telling equilibria when the agents' behavior is not rationalizable.
This observation forces a choice between truth-telling and equilibrium as solution concepts. Let
me detail some reasons why I chose to focus on truth-telling.
First of all, the assumption that agents follow \equilibrium behavior" would place some
stringent demands on the agents' ability to reason strategically. I view it as problematic to
assume, on the one hand, that agents are not even individually rational, but to assume, on the
other hand, that agents are strategically rational. If violations of rationality are due to the
complexity of dierent decision situations, we should expect that strategic rationality is violated
more often than individual rationality, given that strategic reasoning generally involves a high
level of complexity.
Given the simple case of rationalizability, truth-telling is an equilibrium, therefore the as-
sumption of truth-telling can be viewed as a rst-order approximation to strategic behavior in
the case of agents' behavior not being rationalizable. Agents who are not aware that their own
behavior or some other players' behavior is not rationalizable might believe that by truthfully
revealing their choices they are actually following equilibrium behavior.
Moreover, truthtelling could be interpreted as arising out of a form of shortsighted strategic
12rationality: suppose agent i follows the truthful strategy and is assigned house i. Suppose that
H0 is the set of houses still unassigned at the stage when agent i leaves the mechanism. The
requirements of truthtelling imply that agent i will not regret having pointed to i in that stage
if he only considers that stage. There is no house left in H0 that he would solidly prefer to i;
moreover there is an imaginary choice set S0, out of which the agent would have chosen i. In
further illustration of this point, observe that the argument that agent 2 can obtain a solidly
preferred house when deviating from the truthful strategy in Example 1 built on a comparison
of the houses available to that agent in dierent stages of the mechanism.
Let me nally note that it is far from clear how the implementation through strategically
rational behavior should be dened in the present context. Consider the denition according
to which a strategy prole should be considered an equilibrium if no agent can obtain a house
he solidly (or lightly) prefers to the one he is being assigned, if all agents follow the prole.
Now observe that the top trading cycles mechanism implements any allocation according to
this denition of equilibrium: simply x the desired allocation as the initial endowment and
assume the strategy prole according to which each agent points to their own initial assignment.
According to this strategy prole, no player has any inuence on the outcome of the mechanism
and might as well opt to point to his own endowment in the rst stage of the mechanism.
With the notion of truthful implementation in hand, we can now characterize the alloca-
tions that are implemented by hierarchical exchange mechanisms. I denote the outcome of a
mechanism   with initial assignment of ownership p and the assumption of the theory of im-
plementation T for a given house allocation problem E by p T(E). Speaking in terms of the
problem E dened in Section 3, we have that p T(E) = (x;y;z), where   is the top trading
cycles mechanism, p is any permutation, and T is the theory of implementation according to
which agents always point to their choice out of the set of all unassigned houses.
6 Welfare Theorems
Using the concepts developed in the prior two sections, the main observation of the introductory
example can now be summarized as PO9(E) (
S
p p 
T(E) ( PO8(E), with E being the
problem dened in that example,   the top trading cycles mechanism, and T the truthful
theory of implementation according to which all agents at any stage point to their choice out
of the set of houses remaining in the mechanism. In words: all P9 Pareto optima of E are
implementable through trade and any allocation that is truthfully implementable through trade
is P8 Pareto-optimal. These subset relations are strict: the allocation implemented through
trade is not P9 Pareto-optimal. Not every P8 Pareto-optimal allocation is the outcome of
13trade for some initial allocation of houses.
In this section, I show that these statements hold on a vastly more general level: namely, not
just for identication of \trade" with the top trading cycles mechanism  , but with any hierar-
chical exchange mechanisms  , not just for T, but for all truthful theories of implementation,
not just for the E, but for all housing problems. The extensions of the First and Second Funda-
mental Theorem of Welfare Economics can now conveniently be stated as the following subset




 ;T are to be understood over the entire set
of hierarchical exchange mechanisms and the entire set of truthful theories of implementation.
Theorem 1 Any P9-Pareto optimum can be reached through any combination of a trading
mechanism with a truthful theory of implementation. Any allocation that is truthfully imple-

















 PO8(E) for all E:
The rst subset relation translates to the following statement: for any P9-Pareto-optimal allo-
cation , any hierarchical exchange mechanism  , and any theory of implementation T, there
exists an initial allocation of ownership p, such that  is implemented by p  for the theory of
implementation T. This is a version of the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics.
The second subset relation extends the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics to
the environment of house allocation problems without rationalizability: any outcome of trade is
P8-Pareto-optimal; this does not depend on any particular hierarchical exchange mechanism  ,
theory of implementation T, or initial assignment of ownership p.
Proof I start by showing that, for any P9-Pareto-optimal allocation , there exists an ordering
of agents, such that iP8
i k for all k > i and all i. To see this, suppose for all agents i there
existed some set Si  H, such that i 2 Si and i 6= ci(Si). Now let all agents point to the owner
of ci(Si) under . Since there are only nitely many agents, at least one cycle forms. Consider
the allocation 0 with 0
i = ci(Si) for all the agents in the cycle and i = 0
i for all other agents.
Observe that all agents in the cycle lightly prefer their assignment under 0 to their assignment
under : 0
i = ci(Si)P9
i i for all agents i in the cycle. This yields a contradiction with the
P9-Pareto optimality of . So there must be at least one agent who chooses i whenever it is
available. For this agent we have that iP8
i x for all x 2 H. Let i = 1. Since the restriction of
the allocation  to the subsets of all remaining agents f2; ;jNjg and houses H n f1g has to
be also P9-Pareto-optimal, the conjecture follows by induction.
14Next, I show that for any P9-Pareto-optimal  and any mechanism   and theory of imple-
mentation T, there exists an initial assignment of roles p, such that  is the outcome of p T. By
the rst paragraph of the proof, the P9-Pareto optimality of  allows me to order the agents,
such that iP8
i k for all k > i and all i. Now dene p, such that at any given stage an agent
i owns a house if any agent l < i either currently owns a house or already left the mechanism
with his assignment. Assume, furthermore, that any agent i who is an owner of houses (also)
owns house i. Now observe that for any theory of implementation T, agent i must point to
houses with indices l  i, since iP8
i k for k > i. This means that at any stage (at least) the
agent with the lowest index leaves the mechanism. Furthermore, no agent's request for a house
with an index lower than his own will ever be granted; this would require for at least some other
agent to accept a house with an index higher than his own. Consequently, the allocation  arises
out of the mechanism   for the given theory of implementation T.
To see that every outcome of some p T is P8-Pareto-optimal, let  be such an outcome and
assume w.l.o.g. that agents f1; ;lg have been assigned f1; ;lg in the rst stage of the
mechanism. So each of these agents i must have pointed to i in the rst stage, which implies that
i is P8
i -optimal in H for each i (by the requirement of the theory of implementation T). By the
same argument, the houses assigned in the second stage must be P8
i -optimal in H nf1; ;lg
for the agents. Proceeding inductively, we can conclude that  is P8-Pareto-optimal. 
The next theorem summarizes the negative results of the article:
Theorem 2 An allocation might not be P9-Pareto-optimal, even if it is implementable by any
combination of a trading mechanism with some truthful theory of implementation. Some P8-
Pareto-optimal allocations cannot be truthfully implemented through any trading mechanism.
Dierent trading mechanisms truthfully implement dierent sets of allocations. Formally, these
statements can be expressed as follows: there exist house allocation problems E0;E00, and E000 and

























The rst statement implies a failure of the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics
when adopting the notion of P9-Pareto optimality. It posits the existence of some housing
problems and allocations  with the following features: for any notion of trade, there exists an
allocation of ownership rights, such that  arises as the outcome of trade for the given house
15allocation problem. Still  is not P9-Pareto-optimal in that problem. The second statement
shows the limits of the Second Welfare Theorem when adopting P8-Pareto optimality as the
measure of welfare: there are house allocation problems with P8-Pareto-optimal allocations that
cannot be reached by any hierarchical exchange mechanism  , initial allocation of ownership p,
and theory of truthful implementation T. Finally, the last inequality implies that dierent mech-
anisms of hierarchical exchange generally yield dierent sets of allocations for non-rationalizable
choice functions.
In the case of rationalizable preferences the full analog of both Fundamental Theorems of
Welfare Economics holds: in that case, we have P9
i = P8
i and, therefore, PO9(E) = PO8(E) :=
PO(E). Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [1] showed that serial dictatorship as well as Gale's top
trading cycles mechanism each trace out the full Pareto set of any house allocation problem, in
terms of the formalism presented here
S
p pe  (E) =
S
p p (E) = PO(E)14 for e   and   Gale's top
trading cycles mechanism and serial dictatorship respectively. Papai [21] showed that hierarchi-







[6] complements this version of the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics with a
version of the Second to conclude that
S
p p (E) = PO(E) holds for any hierarchical exchange
mechanism  . The next three examples of house allocation problems make up the proof of
Theorem 2.
Proof To see that the outcomes of dierent hierarchical exchange mechanisms need not coin-
cide, consider the following example:
Example 2 Let H = fx;y;zg, and let the choices of agents 1 and 2 satisfy c1(fx;y;zg) = x,
c1(fx;zg) = z, c2(fx;y;zg) = y, and c2(fy;zg) = z. Let agent 3's behavior be rationalizable
by x 3 y 3 z. Observe that  = (x;y;z) is achievable under top trading cycles. To see this,
assume  as the initial allocation and assume a theory of implementation according to which
agents point to ci(H) in the rst stage of the mechanism. The allocation (x;y;z) already obtains
in the rst (and therefore last) stage of the mechanism. To see that  is not implementable via
serial dictatorship, observe that under serial dictatorship either agent 1 or agent 2 has to be
the rst dictator for (x;y;z) to result. If agent 1 is the rst dictator, neither one of the two
remaining agents would pick i as the second dictator. The same holds for the case in which
agent 2 is the rst dictator.
14Note that I am not mentioning any theory of implementation. In the case of all choice functions being
rationalizable, there is a unique theory of truthful implementation. This theory corresponds to the play of
dominant strategies in the normal form game representation of the mechanism.
16To see that not every P8-Pareto-optimal allocation is reachable through some hierarchical ex-
change mechanism, consider the following example:
Example 3 Let H = fx;y;w;zg and let the choice functions of agents 1, 2 and 4 be ratio-
nalizable by x i y i z i w for i = 1;2;4. Let the choice function of agent 3 be such
that ci(S) = y, if y 2 S, c3(fx;z;wg) = z, c3(fz;wg) = w. The allocation  = (x;y;z;w) is
P8-Pareto optimal. However, there is no hierarchical exchange mechanism and implementation
theory that implements . To see this, observe that when all houses are still available, x is the
unique P8
i  maximizer for agents i=1,2, and 4, and y is the unique P8
3  maximizer. Therefore,
in the rst stage of any hierarchical exchange mechanism implementing , (only) agent 1 and
house x will be matched. By the same logic, in the second stage only agent 2 and house y will
be matched. In the third stage, the two remaining agents must view fz;wg as their choice set.
Since c3(fz;wg) = w and c4(fz;wg) = z, the resulting allocation cannot be .
To see that some allocations are not P9-Pareto-optimal, even though they can be reached
through any hierarchical exchange mechanisms, consider the following example.
Example 4 Let H = fx;y;z;wg. Let the choices of agents 1 and 2 be rationalizable by x i
y i z i w for i = 1;2. The choice functions of agents 3 and 4 have the following features:
y 2 S implies that c3(S) = y, c3(fx;z;wg) = w, c3(fz;wg) = z, x 2 S implies c4(S) = x,
c4(y;z;w) = z and c4(fz;wg) = w. Observe that  = (x;y;z;w) is not P9-Pareto-optimal
as wP9
3 z and zP9
4 w, since c3(fx;z;wg) = w and c4(y;z;w) = z. However,  is reachable for
any theory of implementation and any hierarchical exchange mechanism. To see this, x a
hierarchical exchange mechanism and a theory of implementation. Dene p, such that agent 1
is the initial owner of house x and house y is not initially owned by agent 3. In the rst stage
of the mechanism, when no house has been assigned yet, there exist unique maximizers of all
agents P8
i  rankings. Agents 1, 2, and 4 point to house x; agent 3 points to house y. For the
given assumption on the initial assignment, only house x and agent 1 leave the market. Dene
p, such that agent 2 inherits house y, if he does not already own it. If there are two owners in
the second stage, dene p, such that agent 3 is the other owner of a house. If there are 3 owners,
dene p, such that agent 4 owns house w in the second stage. The requirement that agents
should point to houses that are P8
i  maximal among the remaining houses implies that agents
2 and 3 must both point to house y. Given that agent 2 owns house y, he leaves the market
with this house. If agent 4 owns w and points to it for the given theory of implementation, he
appropriates this house and the desired allocation obtains. If not, there is a third stage, with
only agents 3 and 4 and houses z and w remaining. In this stage both must consider fz;wg as
17their choice set. The last two agents' choices from this set are such that the desired allocation
obtains.

The intuition for the dierence between the sets of allocations implemented by dierent
mechanisms is that dierent mechanisms focus the agents on dierent choice sets when making
their decisions. If the agents' behavior is rationalizable, such focus - and, therefore, the choice of a
particular hierarchical exchange mechanism - does not matter. However, in the present case, such
focus does lead to dierent choices and thereby dierent sets of outcomes. A similar intuition can
explain the gaps between the two Pareto sets and the set of allocations that are implementable
through trade. The reason why the allocation  in Example 3 is not implementable is that at
the stage when agent 3 needs to choose house z to obtain the allocation , such a choice is not
compatible with truth-telling. The house z is P8
3 -optimal among the remaining houses; however,
no choice set supports agent 3's choice of z out of the remainder. The P8
3 -optimality of z is
owed to the comparison of z with houses that are long gone and should therefore not have an
eect on choices in the current stage. The gap between the set of P9-Pareto optima and the set
of allocations that are implementable through any mechanism can be explained using the same
logic. In fact, the allocation  in Example 4 is such that agents 3 and 4 can P9-improve by
exchanging their assignments. However, once houses x and y have left the market, both agent
3 and agent 4 would always choose in accordance with . Since for all mechanisms there exist
allocations of initial wealth p, such that x and y leave the market before the other two houses,
the allocation  can be obtained for any hierarchical exchange mechanism.
Note that Theorems 1 and 2 remain valid, if we restrict our attention to any subsets of the
set of all hierarchical exchange mechanisms or the set of all theories of truthful implementation,
as the intersection of a smaller set of sets, is a superset of the intersection of a larger set of sets
and as the union of a smaller set of sets is a subset of the union of a larger set of sets. This
observation implies that the results do not depend on the permissive interpretation of \trade"
as the set of all hierarchical exchange mechanisms. If instead one wants to consider only top
trading cycles or any other subset of hierarchical exchange mechanisms as the appropriate set
of trade mechanisms, the results remain valid. The same holds for the set of theories of truthful
implementation.
There are already some versions of the First and Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare
Economics in the literature on agents with non-rationalizable choices. All results that I am
aware of concern market environments with divisible goods. Bernheim and Rangel [8] prove
18a First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics for markets that are standard except for
the assumption that the agents' behavior need not be rationalizable. Their notion of Pareto
optimality relies on a notion of preferences that is very similar to the P8-preferences dened in
the present article. This result lies very much in line with Theorem 1. Interestingly, Mandler [18]
proves a version of the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics that also denes Pareto optimality
with respect to P8-preferences. This result stands in sharp contrast with Theorem 2 of the
present article, which claims that the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics does
not apply to the case non-rationalizable agents when using the notion of P8-Pareto optimality.
Of course, there are some major dierences in the framing of the problem: Mandler [18] studies
quasi-equilibria in a market environment that is standard except for the assumption that the
agents' choices need not be rationalizable, whereas I study the outcomes of hierarchical exchange
mechanisms that match some indivisible goods to agents. But these dierences do not drive the
stark discrepancy of the results. This discrepancy is caused by my imposition that for any
agent's choice in a mechanism there needs to be some set that is consistent with the underlying
facts, such that the agent's choice can be construed as a choice from this set. The imposition
of such a condition on Mandler's [18] trading environment would possibly also considerably
shrink the set of allocations that are implementable through trade in his environment. The
same arguments apply to the dierence between my results and the ones by Fon and Otani [13],
who prove a version of the First Fundamental Theorem and some price characterizations of the
set of Pareto optima, based on the assumption of intransitive and/or incomplete preferences.
The assumption of such preferences rules out many `irregularities" that are permissible under
the present framework. In their approach, just like in Mandler's, individuals are always willing
to select any preference-maximal element of a choice set. An additional condition has to be
satised in my framework: the preference-maximal element has to be chosen out of a set S that
is consistent with the agent's understanding of the mechanism.
7 Minimally Irrational Behavior
Up until now, any deviations from rationalizability were permitted. In the present Section I ask
how the main two theorems of the paper would change, if we limited our interest to particularly
appealing or small deviations of the assumption of rationalizability. Theorem 1 shows that
the set of all outcomes of trade is nested between the two Pareto sets for any problem E. It
consequently holds unchanged for any subset of problems.
In contrast, Theorem 2 makes three existence claims. Some problems have allocations that
can be reached through any trading mechanism and truthful theory of implementation, even
19if they are not P9-Pareto-optimal. Other problems have P8-Pareto optima that cannot be
reached through any combination of trading mechanism with a truthful theory of implemen-
tation. Finally, for some problems, the sets of allocations that are truthfully implementable
through dierent mechanisms might dier. So the question is whether such problems exist when
we limit the set of permissible problems.
Theorem 2 fails when restricting attention to problems with rationalizable choice functions.
In Section 2, I noted that the subset relation PO9(E)  PO8(E) holds for all E. If all agents'
choice functions are rationalizable, we have that PO9(E) = PO8(E). It is to be expected that the
gap between the two Pareto sets PO8(E) n PO9(E) increases with the \degree" of irrationality
present in the problem E. One might conjecture that Theorem 2 fails (or at least some parts of
it do) if we restrict attention to problems with minimally irrational behavior. The question is:
how irrational do the agents need to be for Theorem 2 to hold? The answer is: not much at all!
To see this, note that all three examples used in the preceding proof either posit that an
agent's choices are rationalizable or that they can be (up to renaming of alternatives) represented
by a choice function ci on H = fx;y;zg with ci(H) = x and ci(fx;yg) = y. None of the examples
makes any further assumptions on the choices of agents from the sets fx;zg and fy;zg. Now
observe that, to be non-rationalizable at all, some violation of the weak axiom of revealed
preference must exist. Since the choice function ci posits nothing beyond a single such violation,
one must consider the dierence between ci and a rationalizable choice function minimal. In
fact, since ci does not specify choices from the sets fx;zg and fy;zg these can be determined,
such that they represent a minimal deviation from rationalizability according to any theory that
measures the degree of such a deviation.
This means, in particular, that Theorem 2 continues to hold when restricting attention to
behavior that is sequentially rationalizable by just two rationales as dened by Manzini and
Mariotti [20], or to behavior that can be explained as choices via checklist of length two as
dened by Mandler [19]. Nothing changes when considering only behavior that is rationalizable
by a game tree with just two agents and two nodes as dened by Xu and Zhou [26]. By the
same logic, Theorem 2 remains valid when considering decision makers whose behavior can
be rationalized with at most two rationales following Kalai, Rubinstein and Spiegler [16], or
when considering decision makers that are minimally irrational following Ambrus and Rozen
[5] or following Apesteguia and Ballester [4]. No matter how little irrationality we permit in
housing problems, there are always some P8 Pareto-optimal allocations that are not truthfully
implementable by any hierarchical exchange mechanism. Dierent mechanisms will generally
implement dierent sets of allocations, even if we only allow for behavior that minimally deviates
20from rational behavior.
8 Conclusion
This paper set out to shed some light on the relation between Pareto optimality and trade under
the assumption that agents are boundedly rational. The problem was framed in an environment
of matching allocation problems. I dened two nested sets of (behavioral) Pareto optima (the
sets of P8  and P9 Pareto optima) for any matching allocation problem. Given that one uses
the more encompassing notion of Pareto optimality, the statement that any outcome of trade
is Pareto-optimal holds true, whereas the statement that any Pareto-optimal outcome can be
reached through trade does not. If one uses the more restrictive notion of Pareto optimality, one
obtains that any Pareto optimum can be arrived at through trade. However, the complementary
statement that any outcome of trade is Pareto-optimal does not hold for the more restrictive
notion of Pareto optimality.
While these results were rst obtained for any non-rationalizable choice functions, they
were considerably strengthened by showing that the results do not change when admitting only
for \minimal deviations" from rationalizability. This latter observation implies, in particular,
that the results are also valid for the environments of kidney exchanges and school allocation,
as described in the introduction. Even if all agents' choices follow decision procedures that
sequentially eliminate options like the doctors' choices described in the introduction, there are
some P8-Pareto optima that cannot be reached through trade. Even if we assume that schooling
choices are determined by the strategic interplay of only two agents, who each act as maximizers
of transitive and complete preferences, dierent mechanisms of trade lead to dierent sets of
outcomes.
This last observation opens up some new questions on the design of matching mechanisms.
For rationalizable choice functions, the sets of allocations implemented do not dier across
dierent trading mechanisms. Any question that relies on the comparison of the outcome sets
of dierent mechanisms (for all initial allocations of ownership) is therefore idle. This changes
dramatically once we relax the assumption of rationalizability. We could now pose such questions
as: which mechanism leads to more egalitarian allocations? Or, which mechanism is more
indeterminate, in the sense that it has a larger set of outcomes? Or, which mechanism privileges
choices from large sets, in the sense that more agents receive houses they would choose out of
larger sets?
Another interesting arena for research is to take the intuitions behind the introductory
stories about decision procedures seriously. One could, for example, assume that patients do
21have (linear) preferences over kidneys, but that it is costly to learn theses preferences. An
allocation mechanism would then interact with some form of strategic information acquisition.
One could go on to use the agents' ex ante utilities for dierent mechanisms to Pareto-rank
dierent mechanisms. In Bade [7], I provide some preliminary observations on this topic and
show, in particular, that not every Pareto Optimum can be reached through free trade in the
case that agents can endogenously acquire information about the objects to be distributed.
Similarly, one could explicitly model the interaction between family members when selecting
a mechanism for school choice. In any case, the results on the connection between trade and
Pareto optimality derived in this article will possibly still be of use as starting points for such
studies.
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